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How consciousness (experience) arises from and relates to material brain processes (the “mind-body problem”) has been pondered by
thinkers for centuries, and is regarded as among the deepest unsolved problems in science, with wide-ranging theoretical, clinical, and
ethical implications. Until the last few decades, this was largely seen as a philosophical topic, but not widely accepted in mainstream
neuroscience. Since the 1980s, however, novelmethods and theoretical advances have yielded remarkable results, openingup the field for
scientific and clinical progress. Since a seminal paperbyCrick andKoch (1998) claimed that a scienceof consciousness should first search
for its neural correlates (NCC), a variety of correlates have been suggested, including both content-specific NCCs, determining particular
phenomenal components within an experience, and the full NCC, the neural substrates supporting entire conscious experiences. In this
review, we present recent progress on theoretical, experimental, and clinical issues. Specifically, we (1) reviewmethodological advances
that are important for dissociating conscious experience from related enabling and executive functions, (2) suggest how critically
reconsidering the roleof the frontal cortexmay furtherdelineateNCCs, (3) advocate theneed for general, objective, brain-basedmeasures
of the capacity for consciousness that are independent of sensory processing and executive functions, and (4) show how animal studies
can reveal population and network phenomena of relevance for understanding mechanisms of consciousness.
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Introduction
What is consciousness? How do our inner, subjective experiences
fit into our scientific world view?Why does consciousness exist at
all? Why are we not simply “zombies,” responding to sensory
input and producing behaviors according to the laws of nature,
but with no subjective experiences?
Questions like these (the mind-body problem, mind versus
matter, consciousness versus brain) have beenpondered by thinkers
for centuries, and are widely regarded as among the deepest un-
solved problems in science, called “the ultimate intellectual chal-
lenge of this newmillennium” (Dehaene and Changeux, 2004) and
“the major unsolved problem in biology” (Crick, 2004) with wide-
ranging theoretical, clinical, and ethical implications.
Until the last few decades, the fundamental problems of con-
sciousness were largely regarded as philosophical, but not widely
accepted as scientific topics in mainstream neuroscience. Thus,
influential textbooks from that period contained little about
these issues, and in the 46 previous annualmeetings of the Society
for Neuroscience (1969–2016) there have been few symposia
explicitly focused on consciousness: a Society for Neuroscience
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satellite symposium on experimental approaches to conscious-
ness chaired by Christof Koch (1998); and a minisymposium on
the neural basis of consciousness chaired by Tsuchiya and Maier
(2012). This is a paradox because the widespread interest in the
brain surely stems much from its unique ability to generate our
conscious experiences, including thoughts, feelings, and dreams.
During much of the last century, the influential behaviorist
school in psychology regarded “introspective” reports of subjec-
tive experiences as unscientific. Since the 1980s, however, pio-
neers have helpedmaking consciousness a researchable, scientific
topic; and novel methods and theoretical advances (e.g. the
global workspace theory (GWT)/global neuronal workspace hy-
pothesis, and the integrated information theory of consciousness
(IIT)) have yielded remarkable results, opening up the field for
scientific and clinical progress (Leopold and Logothetis, 2003;
Owen et al., 2006; Seth et al., 2008; Dehaene andChangeux, 2011;
Aru et al., 2012a; Casali et al., 2013; Hobson et al., 2014; Oizumi
et al., 2014; Pennartz, 2015; Tsuchiya et al., 2015; Koch et al.,
2016b; Tononi et al., 2016).
Nevertheless, some uncertainty and skepticism about the sci-
entific status of this topic still remain, which may be seen as
natural, given its exceptional methodological and philosophical
challenges. Because the concept of consciousness is fundamen-
tally derived from our subjective perspective, it seems hard to
reconcile with science in general, which is based on objectivity,
although certain aspects of experience are verifiable on an inter-
personal basis. In addition, the many different concepts and
meanings of the term “consciousness” remain a source of confu-
sion. In this review, we focus on the most basic concept of con-
sciousness: the existence of subjective experiences, (i.e., percepts,
thoughts, dreams, imagery) that disappear in general anesthesia,
coma, or certain stages of sleep (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011;
Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi et al., 2016). It is widely accepted that
consciousness in this sense encompasses two main dimensions:
(1) the “level” of consciousness (arousal/ wakefulness), largely
controlled by the ascending activation systems of the brainstem
and basal forebrain; and (2) the “content” of consciousness,
thought to be largely represented by the thalamocortical system
(Boly et al., 2013; Sanders et al., 2012; but for a critical review of
“levels “of consciousness, see Bayne et al., 2016).Whereas arousal
appears to be necessary for consciousness, it is not sufficient.
Thus, brain-damaged patients can remain in a “vegetative” state
of unresponsive wakefulness for years, with eyes open but no
apparent signs of conscious content, leading to severe diagnostic
and ethical problems. Thus, consciousness research spans from
the deepest theoretical and philosophical questions to practical,
experimental, clinical, and ethical issues.
Since the seminal paper by Crick and Koch (1998), which
claimed that a science of consciousness should first search for its
neural correlates (NCCs), a range of NCCs have been suggested
in humans and animals. Recently, two varieties ofNCChave been
defined: (1) content-specific NCC determines a particular phe-
nomenal component within an experience (e.g., a specific expe-
rience of a face), whereas (2) the full NCCs are the “neural
substrates supporting conscious experiences in their entirety, ir-
respective of their specific contents” (Koch et al., 2016b). And as
an alternative to the classic distinction between “content” and
“level” of consciousness, the “level”may be regarded as reflecting
“background conditions for being conscious,” such as appropri-
ate neuromodulatory input to “ensure adequate cortical excit-
ability”, whereas the content-specific and full NCCs are both seen
as reflecting content of consciousness (Koch et al., 2016b). And
now, after maturing for almost 30 years, the field reflects on its
earlier findings, asking which of the reported NCCs truly repre-
sent consciousness and which aremerely enabling factors or con-
sequences (Miller, 2007; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Tsuchiya
et al., 2015; Koch et al., 2016b; Tononi et al., 2016).
In the four sections in this review, we present recent progress
on theoretical, experimental, and clinical issues. Specifically, we
(1) review methodological advancements that are important for
dissociating conscious experience from related enabling and ex-
ecutive functions, (2) suggest how critically reviewing the role of
the frontal cortex may further delineate the NCCs, (3) advocate
the need for general, objective, brain-based measures of the ca-
pacity for consciousness that are independent of sensory process-
ing and executive functions, and (4) showhow animal studies can
reveal population and network phenomena of relevance for un-
derstanding mechanisms of conscious states.
How to disentangle content-specific NCC from decision
making and visuomotor processes
A fruitful approach for finding correlates of visual consciousness
has been the use of bistable visual stimuli, where the same phys-
ical stimulus gives rise to different percepts (Leopold and Logo-
thetis, 1999) and perceptual suppression/masking paradigms
where visual stimuli are erased from consciousness (Leopold and
Logothetis, 1999; Kim and Blake, 2005; Dehaene and Changeux,
2011; Tsuchiya et al., 2015) (Fig. 1). In such paradigms, the dif-
ference between the trial-averaged neural activities from one
perceptual state versus the other (e.g., “visible” vs “invisible”) is
typically considered to be a “neural correlate of visual conscious-
ness” (NCC).
This approach identified NCCs in a wide range of brain
regions and at different spatiotemporal scales, using diverse
methods such as single cell, local field potential and EEG/MEG
recordings as well as fMRI in monkeys and humans (Blake and
Logothetis, 2002; Sterzer et al., 2009; Tsuchiya et al., 2015; Koch
et al., 2016b). From these studies, the view has emerged that
NCCs, measured as number of neurons and signal amplitudes
that differentiate between two percepts, gradually increase
from early stages of visual processing (i.e., LGN/V1) toward
“higher-order” association areas and subcortical nuclei (i.e.,
V4/IT/frontoparietal cortices/thalamic pulvinar) (Boly et al.,
2013). Electrophysiological studies in monkeys and humans re-
vealed several signatures of visual consciousness, including a late
and broadly distributed ERP component, called P3b and oscilla-
tions in / (9–30 Hz) and  ( 40 Hz) bands within and be-
tween visual and frontoparietal cortices (Dehaene andChangeux,
2011). Themultitude of brain regions and neural signals reported
as “NCC” already suggests that they fulfill different functions in
the process, leading to the critical question, which is now at the
center of current debates in consciousness research (Aru et al.,
2012b; Fra¨ssle et al., 2014; Tsuchiya et al., 2015; Koch et al.,
2016b; Brascamp et al., 2018): which brain regions and signals
previously reported as NCC constitute the content of visual con-
sciousness, and which reflect either prerequisites (pre-NCC) or
consequent decision and motor processes (post-NCC) that en-
able the perceptual report? To answer this question, researchers
adopted several strategies, including the following: (1) refine-
ment of behavioral paradigms allowing the dissociation between
task demands and conscious stimulus processing; (2) develop-
ment of no-report paradigms; (3) local inactivation and lesion
studies; and (4) noninvasive brain stimulation techniques, such
as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) or direct/alternating
current stimulation. Below we will summarize the latest develop-
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ments for points 1–3 (for a review of noninvasive brain stimula-
tion studies, see, e.g., de Graaf and Sack, 2014).
Task refinements and No-report paradigms
To study the neural basis of mental states, such as conscious
contents, behavioral reports, such as button presses or eye move-
ments, seem necessary. However, relying on overt responses con-
founds the putative NCC with other cognitive variables, such as
selective attention, working memory, motor planning, and per-
formance monitoring (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2012; Tsuchiya et al.,
2015) (Fig. 2). Recent intracranial studies in the thalamic pulvi-
nar and visual cortices in monkeys (Wilke et al., 2009) and an
MEG study across visual cortices in humans (Kloosterman et al.,
2015) have shown that the / power decrease typically associ-
ated with perceptual suppression vanishes when no behavioral
report is required. By systematically varying task relevance and
visual perception in amasking paradigm, a recent EEG study also
came to the conclusion that the P3b ERP component might
reflect a report-related post-NCC process (Pitts et al., 2014b).
Similarly, recent fMRI studies in humans have shown that most
frontoparietal BOLD activity changes related to perceptual
switches during binocular rivalry vanish when task difficulty is
held constant (Knapen et al., 2011) or without report when per-
ceptual switches are inferred from involuntary physiological
measures, such as pupil diameter and optokinetic nystagmus
(Fra¨ssle et al., 2014). It needs to be noted that an apparent absence
of percept-related prefrontal activation does not exclude its par-
ticipation in sustaining visual consciousness since fMRI analysis
relies on somewhat arbitrary thresholding. Indeed, there is evi-
dence from single-cell recordings in monkeys showing image-
specific binocular-rivalry modulation in dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex without a report (Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012). Also,
current no-report paradigms might be problematic because, for
example, pupil size is alsomodulated by cognitive factors, such as
decision uncertainty, reward prediction, and motor preparation;
(Hupe´ et al., 2009; Laeng et al., 2012; Kloosterman et al., 2015;
Overgaard and Fazekas, 2016) and seemingly “perception-related”
optokinetic nystagmus during binocular rivalry is also observed in
monkeys undergoing ketamine anesthesia (Leopold et al., 2002).
Thus, albeit promising, the perfect no-report paradigm to study vi-
sual consciousnesshasnotbeendevelopedyet, andevidencemustbe
derived from orthogonal research approaches.
Lesion and inactivation studies
Human patients andmonkeys with lesions in primary visual cor-
tex (V1) are blind at the corresponding visual field location;
therefore, the role of V1 as a prerequisite for visual consciousness
seems unequivocal (Tong, 2003;Maier et al., 2008).However, the
presence of “blindsight” (Stoerig and Cowey, 1997) (i.e., visually
guided actions without accompanying visual consciousness) un-
derlines that correct stimulus detection and localization do not
necessarily implicate visual consciousness (Goodale et al., 1991;
Cowey and Stoerig, 1995; Schmid et al., 2010; Sahraie et al., 2013;
Ajina et al., 2015). On the other hand, the causal contribution of
neural populations in area V1 (or LGN) as a possible substrate of
conscious perception is difficult to evaluate in lesion studies be-
cause they also constitute prerequisites that might be subtracted
out in the typical contrastive approach. Due to intact primary
visual pathways, conscious perception is easier to evaluate in pa-
tients with higher-order thalamic, superior temporal, parietal,
and frontal lesions, which often lead to impaired responses and
exploration of the contralateral space called “spatial neglect”
(Karnath, 2001; Kerkhoff, 2001; Karnath et al., 2002) (Fig. 3).
However, biased spatial behavior can occur for different reasons,
including impaired visual perception and/or motor decision/
planning deficits. Indeed, using a spatial decision paradigm with
directed eye movements versus button presses showed that infe-
rior parietal lesions in humans interfere with directed saccade
choices but not with visual perception reported with button
presses (Ro et al., 2001).
Similarly, by using local inactivation in specific parietal re-
gions in monkeys (lateral intraparietal and medial intraparietal/
parietal reach region; Fig. 3), several studies showed effector-
specific visuospatial impairments (e.g., for hand but not eye
movement reports and vice versa), which are hard to reconcile
with the notion that the entire parietal cortex serves a critical
function in visual consciousness (Hwang et al., 2012; Christo-
poulos et al., 2015; Katz et al., 2016). A similar case can be made
for the dorsal pulvinar, which strongly interconnects with fron-
toparietal cortices. Spiking rates of pulvinar neurons in monkeys
strongly correlate with reported perception (Wilke et al., 2009;
Komura et al., 2013), but local inactivation andmicrostimulation
there indicate visuomotor impairments with intact visual detec-
tion performance (Wilke et al., 2010, 2013; Dominguez-Vargas et














Figure 1. Examples of bistable stimuli. A, In binocular rivalry, two stimuli are shown to different eyes and perception wavers between left and right eye stimuli (Blake and Logothetis, 2002).
B, Ambiguous structure-from-motion (SfM) stimulus. Dots moving back and forth on a flat screen, without perspective cues to differentiate between front and rear surfaces, induce the perception
of a 3D rotating object that periodically switches direction. (Sterzer et al., 2009) C, Generalized flash suppression. A target stimulus (red dot) is shown parafoveally followed by the onset of amoving
surround, causing the red target to disappear in50% of trials (Wilke et al., 2003).
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contain subregions that are more closely related to visual con-
sciousness as opposed to visuomotor behavior (Driver and Mat-
tingley, 1998;Ward et al., 2002;Harvey andRossit, 2012; Komura
et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2016). Thus, deciphering regional speci-
ficity and the further development and application of behavioral
paradigms that allow the distinction between perceptual and
action planning deficits will remain important. From the begin-
nings of NCC studies, it has been widely assumed that the pre-
frontal cortex plays a critical role in enabling both contents and
levels of consciousness (Crick and Koch, 1998; Leopold and
Logothetis, 1999; Cruse et al., 2011; Dehaene and Changeux,
2011). Because the role of the prefrontal cortex has recently
emerged as one of the most controversial issues in NCC research
(Pennartz, 2015; Koch et al., 2016a), the section belowwill review
the recent correlative and lesion studies on the prefrontal cortex
in more detail.
Are the neural correlates of consciousness mainly in the front
or in the back of the cerebral cortex?
It has been widely assumed that prefrontal cortex is critical for
consciousness as part of a frontoparietal network (Del Cul et al.,
2009; Bor and Seth, 2012; Laureys and Schiff, 2012). However,
recent evidence from lesion, stimulation, and neuroimaging
studies challenges this assumption.
Lesion studies have provided several reports of patients with a
normal level of consciousness after extensive frontal damage. For
example, patient A (Brickner, 1952), after surgical removal of
bilateral prefrontal cortex, once (sic) “toured the Neurological
Institute” with “two [. . .] distinguished neurologists, [. . .] none
of them noticing anything unusual until their attention was es-
pecially called to A” after more than an hour. By contrast, trau-
matic lesions of the posterior corpus callosum, connecting large
parts of the posterior cortex, carry a 214-fold increased risk of
permanent vegetative state (Kampfl et al., 1998). With regard to
the contents of consciousness, there is no clear evidence for loss of
specific experiential contents after frontal damage (Penfield and
Jasper, 1954). Similarly, while lesions in frontal cortices have
been reported to lead to overt visually guided orienting deficits,
they hardly lead to impairments of conscious contents per se (Na
et al., 1998; Mataro´ et al., 2001; Ro et al., 2001). In contrast,
abundant neurological evidence points to lesions in the posterior
cortex causing a loss of specific contents of experience (Farah,
2004). For example, lesions of the right fusiform face area may
cause unconsciousness of faces, and lesions of inferolateral occip-
ital cortex unconsciousness of colors (Barton, 2011).
Electrical stimulation ofmost of the frontal cortex fails to elicit
content-specific changes in experience (Penfield and Jasper, 1954),




brain activity Brain state
Conscious
percept
Correlation we are seeking
x
Observed correlation
Pupil size Optokinetic Nystagmus
A Conceptual problem with visual consciousness studies
B Candidates for no-report readouts of conscious contents
EEG 
(P300/ frequency tagging)
Figure 2. Experimental outline for the no-report paradigm for NCC studies. A, Depiction of the problem.We aim for the correlation between a conscious content and a given brain state. What is
measured experimentally is the correlation between a behavioral report and ameasure of brain activity, whichmight be appropriate or not. Report-related neural activity poses a confound for the
NCC. B, Involuntary physiological measures taken to infer the perceptual state of a subject to circumvent the behavioral report (Tononi et al., 1998; Leopold et al., 2003; Laeng and Endestad, 2012;
Tsuchiya et al., 2015).
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task performance (Selimbeyoglu and Parvizi, 2010). In contrast,
electrical stimulation of posterior cortex more reliably induces
discrete changes in conscious contents. For example, direct
electrical stimulation of early visual areas induces phosphenes
(Beauchamp et al., 2012; Winawer and Parvizi, 2016), whereas
stimulation of the right fusiform gyrus selectively disrupts the
perception of faces (Rangarajan et al., 2014).
Compared with lesion and stimulation studies, neuroimaging
studies offer less direct evidence for the contribution of any one
brain region to consciousness (Farah, 2004). However, neuroim-
aging experiments can demonstrate dissociations between the
NCC and those of other cognitive processes (Aru et al., 2012b; de
Graaf et al., 2012). For example, within-state, no-task paradigms,
which avoid confounds due to behavioral state change and dis-
sociate consciousness from behavioral responsiveness and task
performance, have pointed to a parieto-occipital “posterior hot
zone” as a reliable neural correlate of consciousness during sleep
(Siclari et al., 2017). While studies comparing vegetative state
patients to healthy volunteers highlighted differences in both
frontal and parietal cortices and in thalamocortical connectivity
(Gosseries et al., 2014), within-state approaches comparing min-
imally conscious to vegetative state patients show differences re-
stricted to posterior cortex (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010; King et
al., 2013; Wu et al., 2015). In awake volunteers, studies using
stimuli that are task irrelevant but experienced (thereby dissoci-
ating consciousness from cognitive functions involved in task
demands; Aru et al., 2012b; de Graaf et al., 2012) identified
content-specific NCC in posterior cortices during both inatten-
tional blindness (Pitts et al., 2012) and backward masking exper-
iments (Pitts et al., 2014a) irrespective of task relevance. In
contrast, content-specific NCC at frontal recording sites (P3
component) was only foundwhen the stimuli were task-relevant.
As alluded in the previous section, “no-report” paradigms have
also pointed to posterior regions as the NCC, whereas frontal
cortex activation correlates with reporting (Tsuchiya et al., 2015;
Koch et al., 2016b).
The advent of large-scale neuroimaging databases can
now help to quantify systematic associations between specific
conscious contents and the activation of specific cortical areas
by using meta-analytic reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006;
Yarkoni et al., 2010; Moran and Zaki, 2013; Poldrack and
Yarkoni, 2016). In agreement with lesion and stimulation
studies, reverse inference analyses performed, for example,
with Neurosynth (www.neurosynth.org) locate the best predic-
tors for specific conscious contents within specific areas of pos-
terior cortex, such as the right fusiform face area for face percepts,
occipital areas for visual words or motion, temporal areas for
speech sounds, or parietal areas for touch percepts. In all these
cases, reverse inference fails to highlight frontal areas as predic-
tive for the presence of specific contents of consciousness (Boly et
al., 2017).
Multivariate decoding techniques can also help to identify the
true NCC as the brain activity patterns that have the highest
predictive value for specific conscious percepts (Haynes, 2009;
Sandberg et al., 2014). Using such approaches, the best predictor
for the presence versus absence of consciousness has been located
in temporo-parieto-occipital cortices both during non-rapid eye
movement (NREM) sleep (Siclari et al., 2017) and in patients
with brain damage (Demertzi et al., 2015; Stender et al., 2016).
While studies comparing brain function during anesthesia versus
wakefulness consistently highlighted differences in both frontal
and parietal cortices and in thalamocortical connectivity (Alkire
et al., 2008), activity in frontal regions was shown to be poorly
predictive for the presence versus absence of connected con-
sciousness (Gaskell et al., 2017).On the other hand, the predictive
value of posterior cortex activity for consciousness during anes-
thesia still needs to be assessed (Boly et al., 2017). With regard to
the contents of consciousness, numerous studies in both awake
and dreaming subjects could decode the presence of specific con-
scious contents from specific activity patterns in posterior cortex
(Nishimoto et al., 2011; Horikawa et al., 2013; Siclari et al., 2017),






Lesions leading to spatial neglect in humans Local inactivation findings in monkeys
Spatial choice deficit for reaching movements 
+ optic ataxia
Spatial choice deficit for saccades
Spatial choice deficit for 









Figure 3. A, Major cortical and subcortical brain regions where lesions lead to spatial neglect in humans (left), and corresponding recent experimental results in monkeys (right) (lateral view).
Inhumans, lesions in frontal (Brodmannarea44), inferior parietal cortex (Brodmannarea40), superior temporal gyrus (STG), basal ganglia, andpulvinarhavebeen reported to lead to spatially biased
behavior that might appear as a visual consciousness deficit (Karnath, 2001).B, Recent pharmacological inactivation studies inmonkeys have shown primarily effector-specific spatial deficits after
lesions in parietal subregions such as the lateral intraparietal area (LIP, red shading) and the parietal reach region (PRR, which includes the medial intraparietal area MIP and area V6A, green
shading). Dorsal pulvinar (dPULV, orange shading) inactivation leads to spatial orienting bias for both eye and handmovements which can be compensated by visual reward cues, suggesting that
visual perceptionmight be preserved. Ventral pulvinar (vPULV, purple shading) inactivation leads to change detection deficits resembling visual neglect. Summarized from local inactivation studies
in monkeys (Wardak et al., 2002; Wilke et al., 2010; Hwang et al., 2012; Wilke et al., 2012; Wilke et al., 2013; Hwang et al., 2014; Christopoulos et al., 2015; Katz et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2016).
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Working memory contents can also be more reliably decoded
from the back than from the front of the cortex (Emrich et al.,
2013).
Together, evidence from lesion, stimulation, and neuroimag-
ing studies consistently points to regions of the posterior cortex,
including temporal, parietal, and occipital areas, as a “hot zone”
for consciousness, in which different brain activity patterns may
specify different experiential contents. By contrast, evidence for a
content-specific contribution of the prefrontal cortex is scarce or
indirect. At a minimum, detailed descriptions of conscious pa-
tients after extensive bilateral frontal resections demonstrate that
an entirely intact prefrontal cortex is not necessary for conscious-
ness. It remains possible that some prefrontal regions may con-
tribute specific conscious contents, such as feelings of reflection,
valuation, and affect (Koch et al., 2016a). In the future, within-
state paradigms applied to sleep dreaming (Siclari et al., 2017)
and daydreaming (Perogamvros et al., 2017) will be critical to
dissociate content-specific NCC from task-related cognitive pro-
cesses (Koch et al., 2016b).
Measuring brain complexity to detect (and promote) the
recovery of consciousness.
Detecting the presence of consciousness in clinical practice relies
ultimately on a behavioral input–output paradigm: a neurologist
typically probes the patient with sensory stimuli of different mo-
dalities or verbal commands and observes his motor responses
(Giacino et al., 2004). If the patient reliably produces outputs that
are specific for the different inputs, he is considered conscious.
The earlier sections of this review already pointed out that this
approach can be problematic: unresponsiveness can be paired
with consciousness. However, thanks to recent conceptual and
technical advances, a similar input–output paradigm can now be
applied even to patients who are fully paralyzed and cannot en-
gage inmotor behavior (Owen et al., 2006; Cruse et al., 2011;Naci
et al., 2014). In this case, subjects are still presented with sensory
stimuli or verbal instructions (e.g., “imagine playing tennis”), but
the blockage of motor output is bypassed by directly reading-out
neuronal responses with fMRI or EEG. These neuroimaging par-
adigms can be easily interpreted in case of positive results: unre-
sponsive subjects whowillfully produce neuronal activations that
are consistent and specific for the given input are considered
conscious. However, many brain-injured patients may recover
consciousness, yet fail to produce the appropriate neuronal re-
sponses (Monti et al., 2010; Bardin et al., 2011).
One potential reason for this false-negative result is that con-
sciousness may be present not only independently of executive/
motor functions but also in the absence of sensory processing.
For example, during dreaming, complex, temporally unfolding
episodes can be as intense and vivid as waking experiences, yet
sensory stimuli are typically ignored and rarely incorporated into
the experience (Koulack, 1969; Nir and Tononi, 2010). Con-
sciousnessmay completely disconnect from the external environ-
ment also during some forms of anesthesia, such as ketamine,
which induces a dreamlike, hallucinatory state associated with
sensory disconnection and complete unresponsiveness (Hejja
and Galloon, 1975). Similar disconnections may occur in patho-
logical conditions, whereby patients may be conscious but fail to
produce the right neuronal responses to peripheral stimuli just
because their sensory pathways and cortices are damaged or func-
tionally disabled. Indeed, intensive care medicine is artificially
producing, as a byproduct of saving many lives, brains that may
remain isolated, split, or fragmented (Schiff et al., 1999). In the
extreme case, large cortical islands, or an archipelago of islands,
may survive totally dissociated from the world outside (Gosseries
et al., 2014). Can these islands sustain consciousness? Does it feel
like anything to be a big chunk of isolated human cortex? For
now, we cannot answer this question. What we know is that in
such cases assessing consciousness based on sensory inputs and
motor/neuronal outputs would be ineffective.
To address this problem, it would be useful to develop com-
plementary metrics to probe directly the internal brain capacity
for consciousness (i.e., the full NCC as defined in Koch et al.,
2016b) independently of the integrity of sensory processing and
executive functions. With this in mind, a novel metric, the Per-
turbational Complexity Index (PCI), was recently introduced
(Casali et al., 2013). PCI is directly inspired by the Integrated
information theory of Consciousness (Tononi et al., 2016) and by
its fundamental phenomenological axiom: each conscious expe-
rience is both differentiated (i.e., it hasmany specific features that
distinguish it from a large repertoire of other experiences) and
integrated (i.e., it cannot be divided into independent compo-
nents). Thus, PCI gauges directly the amount of information
(differentiation) that can be generated through large-scale causal
interactions (integration)within the thalamocortical system.Op-
erationally, the index quantifies the complexity (algorithmic
compressibility) of the EEG response to a direct cortical pertur-
bation with TMS.
Put simply, PCI involves perturbing directly the thalamocor-
tical system and characterizing the “echo” it produces, an ap-
proach very similar to what we would do with any unknown
object; we knock on it with our knuckles and deduce what it
might contain based on the sound it makes. Per theoretical pos-
tulates, a conscious brain should “sound” very different from an
unconscious one. When consciousness is lost, the TMS-EEG
“echo” will either be local because neurons are unable to engage
in reciprocal causal interactions (low integration), or it will be
global but stereotypical, because all elements engage in the same
pattern (low differentiation). The EEG echo will be both global
and differentiated (i.e., complex) only if many elements interact
through specific mechanisms (integrated information).
Albeit macroscopic and coarse, the PCI measurement pro-
videdmaximum (100%) accuracy in detecting consciousness in a
large (n  150) benchmark population of subjects who could
confirm the presence or absence of conscious experience through
immediate or delayed reports. Brain complexity was lower in all
unresponsive subjects who did not report any conscious experi-
ence upon awakening from NREM sleep or midazolam, xenon,
and propofol anesthesia, and was invariably higher in conditions
in which consciousness was present, including awake controls
and subjects who were disconnected and unresponsive during
rapid eye movement (REM) sleep and ketamine anesthesia but
retrospectively reported having had vivid conscious experiences
upon awakening. Once calibrated on the gold standard of subjec-
tive reports, PCI measurements performed at the bedside of
brain-injured noncommunicating subjects offered unprece-
dented sensitivity (94%) in detecting minimal consciousness in
patients and allowed identifying a significant percentage (20%)
of vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome cases
with high brain complexity. In these behaviorally unresponsive
patients, PCI values overlapped with the distribution of the
benchmark conscious condition, suggesting the presence of dis-
connected consciousness, which eventually resulted in a higher
rate of recovery (Casarotto et al., 2016).
Measuring complexity and studying its mechanisms in the
brain may also offer valuable insights on the neuronal bases of
loss and recovery of consciousness. TMS is a strong, coarse-
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grained perturbation that activates many diverging cortical and
corticosubcortical connections; therefore, PCI is a global mea-
sure that cannot resolve whether there are preferential hubs of
complexity within the brain (e.g., in the parietal or in the frontal
lobe). Ongoing studies using localized, intracortical single-pulse
electrical stimuli and mesoscale (local field potential) recordings
may provide deeper insight. For example, a recent intracranial
human study (Pigorini et al., 2015) identified a simple mecha-
nism by which the emergence of sustained interaction among
cortical areas may be impaired during dreamless sleep: upon re-
ceiving an input, cortical neurons tend to respond briefly, then
hush and “forget.” This behavior, a potential killer for brain
complexity, is due to a basic dynamic, also known as cortical
bistability, by which individual neurons tend to fall into a silent
hyperpolarized state (down state) after an initial activation (up
state) (Compte et al., 2003; Sanchez-Vives et al., 2017). Down
states, which aremainly engendered by activity-dependent potas-
sium (K) currents during physiological NREM sleep (Timofeev
et al., 2001), may be generally relevant for consciousness and its
disorders for at least three reasons. First, they can also occur in
pathological conditions due to alterations of the inhibition/exci-
tation balance (Murase et al., 2004) or as a consequence of white
matter injury (Timofeev et al., 2000). Second, they can be inves-
tigated from the intracellular level in animal models (Steriade et
al., 1993) to the whole network level in humans (Cash et al.,
2009). Third, they can impair network interactions globally
(Lewis et al., 2012; Pigorini et al., 2015; Olcese et al., 2016), but
they are in principle reversible.
Notably, a recentmicroscale study using electrical stimulation
and recordings in isolated cortical slices (an extreme case of cor-
tical island) showed that complex causal interactions, as assessed
by an adapted version of PCI, can be restored by pharmacological
manipulations that reduce neuronal bistability (D’Andola et al.,
2017). Can some of these concepts be translated to the bedside of
comatose patients? Some patients with vegetative state/unre-
sponsive wakefulness syndrome spontaneously flip from a low-
complexity condition to a conscious high-complexity state for no
apparent reason (Rosanova et al., 2012). Will we be able to un-
derstand and promote this process? In the years to come, it will be
crucial to further elucidate the relationships between single-
neuron dynamics, overall network complexity, and conscious-
ness through extensive experiments across scales, species, and
models.
The conscious rodent brain: ensemble activity and long-range
correlation patterns
Animal models provide a unique window to probe the neuron-
level mechanisms of many cognitive processes, including con-
sciousness. Rodents, in particular, offer an unprecedented range
of tools to access all circuital elements of the brain, and share
many features with the human brain. However, when addressing
the question of consciousness in rodents or other animals, it is
crucial to ask whether these animals can be conscious at all. It is a
valid question regardless of species, applying to nonhuman pri-
mates as well as rodents. Although one may adopt an agnostic
stance on the topic and just call for further research (Gutfreund,
2017), there is an increasing need to come up with a neuroscien-
tific account of animal consciousness, not necessarily providing
definitive answers but rather a “best estimate” facilitating rational
decisions on issues of great societal relevance, such as ritual
slaughter and pain mitigation in animal health care.
The question of rodent consciousness can be split into two
components: (1) do rodent brains have conscious states as op-
posed to unconscious states (e.g., during dreamless sleep or
anesthesia)? (2) What are the contents of consciousness as expe-
rienced by rodents? The first question is less difficult to address
than the second, as is also the case for nonhuman primates and
humans: conscious contents refer to subjective and qualitative
aspects of our experiences, which are notoriously hard to get at
due to their essentially private nature. In contrast, there are sev-
eral arguments in favor of rodents having at least a basic capacity
to sustain conscious states: (1) the fact that electrophysiological
markers indicative of conscious states in humans and primates
are also found in rodent brains (e.g., markers for wakefulness and
REM sleep, such as desynchronized EEG, as opposed to slow
waves in NREM sleep); (2) the strong anatomical homologies
between the systems in rodent and human brains deemed impor-
tant for conscious states (mainly, thalamocortical systems); and
(3) the presence of behavioral indicators of conscious states,
overlapping in use and applicability between humans and ro-
dents. Such indicators do not only include sleep–wake cycles and
markers of wakefulness, such as behavioral reactivity to sensory
stimuli and orienting responses, but also the ability to generate
nonhabitual (i.e., goal-directed) behaviors (Weiskrantz, 1995;
Pennartz, 2015) and distinctive behavioral responses when stim-
uli are perceived or not (Carandini and Churchland, 2013). A
fourth argument is based on recently developedmeasures of con-
sciousness (Massimini et al., 2005; Ferrarelli et al., 2010; Casali et
al., 2013). As in humans and primates, wakeful states in rodents
are marked by a higher degree of complexity (Hudetz et al., 2015,
2016) and long-range functional connectivity than during deep,
NREM sleep or anesthesia (Olcese et al., 2016). This fourth argu-
ment goes beyond “physiological hallmarks” because it is based
on inferred functional properties of conscious systems, such as
the ability to integrate complex information (Tononi and Edel-
man, 1998), to generate interactions and joint coding between
sensory modalities and memory (Pennartz, 2009), and to repre-
sent a near-instantaneous “world model” efficiently and usefully
(Pennartz, 2015). While many questions also regarding this ar-
gument remain open in rodents, our best, evidence-based guess is
that rodent brains are indeed capable of sustaining conscious
states, regardless of the precise complexity and richness of repre-
sented contents compared with primates. Here we will review
recent findings related to this fourth argument, and discuss how
they expand our understanding of NCCs in the rodent brain.
The ability to integrate complex information and generate
interactions sustaining world representations eventually resides
in the brain’s information-coding elements: neurons. Because
most previous comparisons between conscious, sleep, and anes-
thetized states in humans have used recording techniques with
macroscopic and mesoscopic resolution (Massimini et al., 2005;
Ferrarelli et al., 2010; Park and Friston, 2013; but see Lewis et al.,
2012) (EEG, local field potential, or fMRI), it has been difficult to
determine how the loss of global functional connectivity (e.g.,
during transitions from wakefulness to NREM sleep) is associ-
ated with cell-level changes in correlation patterns. The few stud-
ies on the topic are somewhat inconsistent and report either no
change in functional connectivity between conscious and uncon-
scious states (Zhang et al., 2014) or a dramatic loss of communi-
cation (Makino and Komiyama, 2015; Ishizawa et al., 2016). We
investigated this using multiarea tetrode recordings in sensory
neocortex and hippocampus of rats undergoing transitions from
wakefulness to NREM sleep (for methods, see Bos et al., 2017).
We computed conditionalmutual information (cMI) to quantify
functional connectivity between spike train patterns across all cell
pairs, as this measure includes nonlinear correlations that would
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escape detection by linear methods (Steuer et al., 2002; MacKay,
2003). Although the results showed area-specific changes in
correlation patterns, they confirmed that global functional con-
nectivity drops from wakefulness to NREM sleep (Olcese et al.,
2016). This effect was due to a selective loss of interareal interac-
tions between excitatory neurons but not interneurons, whereas
intra-areal connectivity was largely preserved for both neuronal
types (Fig. 4A). Thus, the drop in global connectivity during
NREM sleep is not paralleled by a similar drop in intra-areal
connectivity, allowing local computations in relative “islands of
activity” to continue. Because cMI does not indicate the direction
of information flow between neurons, we also computed the
transfer entropy between spiking neurons, and found that this
measure allows to distinguish several regimes for directed com-
munication in the brain, depending on the time scale of neural
interaction, the anatomical distance between neurons, and, in-
triguingly, the presence of a neural correlate to the behavioral
task performed by the animal before NREM sleep (U.O. et al.,
unpublished observations).
In addition to spike-based markers distinguishing different
brain states, we set out to study differences in ensemble behavior
within the awake, conscious state, when animals performed a
visual detection task. While correlates of conscious perception
have been recently described at the level of membrane potential
dynamics and spiking activity (Pinto et al., 2013; Sachidhanan-
dam et al., 2013; Manita et al., 2015; Takahashi et al., 2016),
especially involving recurrent activity between cortical areas, it is
still poorly understood how perception is reflected in population
dynamics. Using a range of visual contrasts, mice were trained to
respond to presentations of moving gratings by performing lick-
ing actions (however, note that this go/no go paradigm does not
exhaustively test for consciousness (Koch, 2004; Montijn et al.,
2015; Pennartz, 2015). Ensemble activity in layer 2–3 of mouse
V1was recorded by 2-photonCa2 imaging, andwe askedwhich
of two measures would more accurately correspond to hit versus
miss trials: the mean somatic Ca2 response or the population
heterogeneity (for explanation, see Fig. 4B,C). We found that
heterogeneity allowed a significantly better separation between
hit and miss trials than the mean response (Montijn et al., 2015)
(Figure 4D). Moreover, applying heterogeneity (but not mean
dF/F0) to the baseline (prestimulus) period, it proved feasible to
predict the type of detection response (fast hit response vs miss
or slow response). Thus, heterogeneity of single-cell responses
within larger ensembles may indicate a neural correlate of detec-
tion and/or perception along with arousal and attention (Pinto et
al., 2013). We suggest that a state of high heterogeneity arises in
association with EEG desynchronization, and is conducive to
having a high degree of differentiated, stimulus-specific coding in
Figure 4. A, Summary ofmain findings on spike-based functional connectivity in rats (Olcese et al., 2016). Couplingwasmeasured as pairwise cMI between single neurons. Duringwakefulness,
cMI between neurons located in the same or different areas is largely balanced (left) for both excitatory and inhibitory neurons (black and red lines, respectively). In NREM sleep, interareal (but not
intra-area) coupling between excitatory neurons is significantly reduced. This did not apply to intra-area cMI and interareal cMI (between interneurons). Line thickness indicates the proportion of
neuronal pairs for which cMI was significantly0. Asterisks indicate which connections showed a significant change between wakefulness and NREM sleep (the only significant differences found
pertained to interareal coupling between excitatory neurons). Thus, during NREM sleep, neural computations may continue in local “islands of activity,” whereas global integration capabilities are
reduced. B, Calculation of heterogeneity across a neuronal population (compare Montijn et al., 2015). A measure of a neuronal activity change (A, e.g., the relative fluorescence response
of a neuron in 2-photon imaging, dF/F0) is computed across all neurons. Next, the responses are z-scored per neuron across all trials and all trial types (e.g., in a given session, visual stimuli
are presented at 6 different contrasts; each contrast is presented 20 times; 120 trials in total). Per trial, the absolute difference in z-scored activity is then calculated across all pairs of
neurons (e.g., A1,2 is the difference between the responses of neurons 1 and 2). The population heterogeneity in a given trial is the mean of activity differences across all pairs.
C, Examples of high (left) versus low heterogeneity (right) in a neuronal population, where response strength is indicated by color saturation. D, In a visual stimulus detection task
performed by mice that were subjected to 2-photon imaging of V1 neuronal populations, heterogeneity was better capable of separating hit (detection) and miss (nondetection) trials
than the mean fluorescence response (area under the curve resulting from receiver-operating characteristic analysis). Both measures predicted response behavior above chance: mean
response, *p 0.05; heterogeneity, ***p 0.001; area under the curve 0.5, chance level. Behavior was predicted better by heterogeneity than mean response (**p 0.01). Values
are mean SEM across animals. Data from Montijn et al. (2015).
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a neural network (Pennartz, 2009; Goltstein et al., 2015; Tononi
et al., 2016; compare Renart et al., 2010). In line with this, the
presence and orientation of the stimulus were better decodable
from the population when the animal made a correct detection
response and heterogeneity was high. Strong heterogeneity in
sensory cortical cell populations may thus correlate with better
representational performance. However, this position does not
exhaust the repertoire of potential neural correlates: when ana-
lyzing assembly activity as manifested by multineuron activity
sequences, we found that visual detection (hit trials) was also
paired with a higher consistency in the timing of single-cell activ-
ity within the sequence than nondetection (miss trials) (Montijn
et al., 2015).
Although rodent behavioral paradigms need to be developed
further to yield more specific markers of consciousness, we may
conclude that ensemble studies are beginning to reveal popula-
tion and network phenomena relevant for understanding not
only what conscious states consist of (i.e., the cell-level nature of
NCCs), but alsowhy such states are conducive for optimal coding
of the stimuli and complex scenes of which we can become
conscious.
Conclusions and perspectives
In conclusion, consciousness, once regarded as a purely philo-
sophical topic, the “mind-body problem”, has become an active
research field in neuroscience. Neuroscientific consciousness re-
search, boosted by novel methods and theoretical advances, has
become increasingly accepted and mature, and is now beginning
to yield remarkable scientific and clinical progress.
As is often the case within a developing branch of science,
concepts and mechanisms that were previously often blended
and confused are now being teased apart and more clearly defined.
“Content-specific” and “full” NCCs are becoming increasingly well
defined. Improved strategies allow conscious experience to be dis-
tinguished from related enabling and executive functions, for
example, through employment of refined behavioral/no-report
paradigms, local inactivation and lesions, and noninvasive brain
stimulation. A closely related, critical reevaluation of the prefron-
tal cortex’ role in consciousness suggests that, although impor-
tant for behavioral reporting and other executive functions, it is
not crucial for conscious experiences per se. Instead, converging
evidence points to a posterior “hot zone” for consciousness in-
cluding parietal, temporal, and occipital areas.
Methods for objective assessment of consciousness are crucial,
both experimentally and clinically. The PCI is a highly promising
metric for detecting consciousness, inspired by the Integrated
information theory. Without requiring any sensory input or be-
havioral report (i.e., executive functions), PCI seems to be a reli-
able indicator of the human brain’s capacity for consciousness,
being related to the amount of information that can be generated
through causal brain interactions. PCI has recently proved highly
accurate in a large benchmark population of conscious or uncon-
scious subjects.
This progress also offers insights into neuronal bases of loss
and recovery of consciousness, and how these may be manipu-
lated. Thus, converging evidence from animals and humans
suggest that neuronal “bistability,” a dynamic property of cortical
circuits, can cause unconsciousness by impairing brain complex-
ity. Recently, pharmacological suppression of bistability was
shown to restore the complex causal interactions required for
consciousness. Rodent models are being developed to allow dis-
section of molecular, cellular, and circuit mechanisms of con-
sciousness. Ensemble recordings begin to reveal how, in addition
to complexitymeasures, heterogeneity and spike-basedmeasures
of functional connectivity can be used to differentiate conscious
and unconscious states, and why conscious states promote opti-
mal coding. Population coding studies promise to enable re-
searchers to study consciousness in terms of brain-generated
representations, thus supplementing global assessments of inte-
grated information.
Rather than trying to solve allmajor theoretical problems first,
we advocate an interleaved practical and theoretical approach.
Experiments across scales, species, and models, spanning from
ion channels, neurons, andmicrocircuits to whole-brain simula-
tions, from unit and ensemble recordings in animals to the
patient’s bedside, will be crucial for bridging the gaps between
single-neuron dynamics, overall network complexity, and con-
scious experience. This is a daunting task and the stakes are high,
but the recent progress is promising.
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